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THE REQUIREMENT FOR A UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY COMMAND

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

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Jun 29, 1990

by

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to transport these United States based forces been sufficient for the task required of them. Nor has there ever been a viable single command which is responsible for joint planning, training, deploying, employing and sustaining U.S. based forces for contingency operations. The political and fiscal constraints of the 1990's will probably result in: a reduction in the number of troops the United States has based overseas as well as at home; a reduction in the number of United States owned or accessible bases worldwide; a awareness of "other" threats to the United States and our allies. Whether all or none of these come to pass, the United States will still have requirement to deploy U.S. based troops worldwide to engage in contingency type missions. This requirement demands a single headquarters.

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of World War II, the United States military strategy has depended on a significantly large overseas based deployed force, supported by military forces based in Continental United States. The United States based forces had the mission of deploying to reinforce the overseas commands, or conducting contingency operations under them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or independantly. But at no time since World War II has the air and sea lift forces to transport these United States based forces been sufficient for the task required of them. Nor has there ever been a viable single command which is responsible for joint planning, training, deploying, employing and sustaining U.S. based forces for contingency operations. The political and fiscal constraints of the 1990s will probably result in: a reduction in the number of troops the United States has based overseas as well as at home; a reduction in the number of United States owned or accessible bases worldwide; a declining threat to Europe by the Soviet Union; and an increased awareness of "other" threats to the United States and our allies. Whether all or none of these come to pass, the United States will still have a requirement to deploy U.S. based troops worldwide to engage in contingency type missions. This requirement demands a single headquarters.

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INTRODUCTION

"History abounds in examples of states that have come to grief pursuing political goals too ambitious for the military means available for their support."1 Maxwell Taylor

For the past forty-five years the interests of the United States (US), as articulated by our presidents, have been: the survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with fundamental values intact and institutions and people secure; the maintenance of a healthy and growing US economy; a world stable, secure and free of major threats; and a growth of human freedom, democratic institutions and free market economy. 2

Until recently, the chief threats to these interests have been the Soviet Union's military threat to Europe, its sponsorship of anti-democratic movements (to include terrorism), and its efforts to expand its military, political and economic influence worldwide. During the past three years international drug trafficking has emerged as an additional threat to US security interests.3

Up to now, our military strategy to help attain national goals has essentially been one of maintaining a large forward deployed defensive force in Europe, a smaller force in Korea and Japan, and numerous military bases world wide. In addition, we have kept a strong general purpose and special operations force in Continental United States (CONUS) which may be deployed world wide to support military actions at all levels of conflict.4 Despite Mr.

Gorbachev's announced intentions of reducing the Soviet Union's military threat to us and our allies, "we must base our defense planning on the actual capabilities of potential enemies, and not their announced intentions".⁵

But now several things are changing. The Soviet Union appears to have changed the threat upon which our strategy is built. The availability of US bases on foreign soil is becoming increasingly tenuous, while the need for these bases has and will continue to increase. There is increasing pressure to reduce defense spending and with this the size and composition of the military establishment. All of this seems to indicate a need to review our military requirements and strategy.⁶

The United States is a global power with global interests. It thus requires a capability to project military power, for whatever reason, at whatever level necessary, anywhere in the world. Forward deployed forces and forward bases (or access to forward bases) must be augmented with a credible CONUS based power projection force which is rapidly deployable, can be tailored to the mission and is sustainable for whatever period of time is needed to counter the threat and achieve US national objectives. These power projected forces must be capable of executing a wide range of missions, across the operational continuum, from peacekeeping to countering terrorist or insurgent threats to allies to the execution of rapid, timely and successful contingency operations. The force must be properly balanced with light, heavy and special operations units which are well trained, synergistic and sustainable.⁷ And it must be credible. By credible I mean: it must physically exist; it must be a well

trained, mobile and lethal force; it must be success oriented; and when needed, its use must be supported by the American people as well as by the American government.

The purpose of this paper is to state that the US does not have a headquarters capable of efficiently and effectively planning, training, deploying, employing and sustaining the already existing but uncoordinated military forces we have stationed in CONUS.

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

The Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps currently have 2.1 million men in uniform and another 1.6 million in the National Guard and Reserve. Of these, 356,000 are stationed ashore or afloat in Europe or Africa, 141,000 are stationed in the Pacific or Asia, 15,000 are stationed in Latin or South America and the remaining 1.6 million are stationed in CONUS or Alaska.⁸ All of them are assigned or dedicated to one or more of the ten unified or specified commands that answer to the the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Due to a declining military budget, the Conventional Stability Talks, and questions on the future of US foreign bases, it is probable that foreign based US troops will be reduced over the next several years and that the overall size of the active military will be reduced to somewhere around 1.5 million.⁹ If this happens, the requirement for a CONUS based contingency force will be all the more

important.

To fulfill our global commitment, the CONUS stationed forces are supposedly designed and organized so they can mobilize and deploy to assist the geographical unified commands in Europe (EUCOM), the Pacific (PACOM), South America (SOUTHCOM), the Atlantic (LANTCOM) or Southwest ASIA (CENTCOM) or conduct limited contingency operations on their own.¹⁰

A key component of US military strategy is to be able to rapidly deploy these US based forces to deter major conflicts in an area of operation where the already deployed forces are insufficient for the task or there are no US forces assigned or available.¹¹ To provide for this, the US Army has used a blend of forward deployed heavy equipment (stored and ready for US troops to join and use), and created light infantry divisions which can be deployed on minimum notice by airlift. If necessary, these forces will be sustained from CONUS and reinforced with heavier divisions.¹²

However, it is well known that the airlift and sealift assets to accomplish this rapid deployment and sustaining mission have been sorely lacking.¹³ Moreover, the CONUS based contingency forces are lacking in joint training, are hampered by service rivalries, and are not organized under one command with sole responsibility for planning, training, deploying, employing, and sustaining contingency missions.¹⁴

HISTORY OF US RAPID DEPLOYMENT/EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABILITY

Until World War II the Marine Corps had been the only US rapid deployment force.¹⁵ Then in the early 1960's a strategic concept evolved which exceeded their capability. That concept was the "half war". Besides a major war in Europe and/or Asia, there might be global requirements to commit US troops to engage in small limited wars (half wars) or perform military contingency type missions. These small wars were in areas outside the boundaries of the two major geographical commands, European Command (EUCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM), or within their areas but exceeding their assigned force structure. This concept was due to the then expanding, but nebulous, global threat to the US and to our allies. It realized that the global interests of the US might need defending by a US global contingency force.¹⁶

In 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara formed STRIKE COMMAND (STRIKE), the first unified command whose mission, in theory, was to plan for a conventional reinforcement of overseas commands or the execution of independent contingency missions. In that year, he took the already existing Strategic Army Corps and the Air Force Composite Air Strike Force, and placed them under the operational control of STRIKE. Interservice rivalry, the lack of assigned navy, airlift and sealift forces and the Vietnam war rapidly disintegrated any hope of developing a force to fight the "half wars" or properly organize, train and deploy reinforcing forces. In 1968, in addition to its "global mission", STRIKE was given the geographical area of responsibility for the East Atlantic and Mediterranean (but still with no navy forces assigned). It was disbanded in January 1972.¹⁷

In January 1972 the United States Readiness Command (REDCOM) was formed as a unified command. But its emphasis was on joint training and readiness and not on deployment. Thus the capability to fight the "half war" was again turned over to the Marine Corps with the Army 18th Airborne Corps as a CONUS strategic reserve. The reason for this deemphasis on contingency/expeditionary forces was of course the result of the Vietnam "half war".¹⁷ At about the same time the McNamara two-and-a-half war concept (war in Europe and Asia, as well as a small war somewhere else) was redefined to a one-and-a-half war (war in Europe and somewhere else).

In the early 1980's, the Reagan administration rejected the single half war scenario.¹⁸ It was then and now envisioned that the US might have the requirement and must have the capability to meet a wider range of global conflicts. It was believed that the US might have to commit forces in several locations at the same time. In addition, the concept of national and strategic horizontal escalation was developed. This concept called for the US to deploy and fight an adversary at a location outside the primary theatre of his choosing in an area chosen by the National Command Authority.

The half war and horizontal escalation concepts combined would seem to indicate the need for a special unified global contingency force as well as a command to be prepared to reinforce Europe. For many reasons this did not come to be.¹⁹

In 1981 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formed under REDCOM. Its mission was to be able to deploy as a global contingency force and fight the on-again off-again "half wars". But the focus of RDJTF planning was not really global, for it was

dedicated to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Thus it became essentially a reinforcing unit to the geographical commands who owned that territory, EUCOM and PACOM. In 1983 the RDJTF became the geographical Central Command (CENTCOM) and was given the geographical area of responsibility for the Middle East and Southwest Asia. REDCOM was disbanded and turned its mission of joint training and readiness over to Forces Command (FORSCOM), which was both a specified command under the SECDEF and a Department of the Army major command.¹⁷

DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED A
SEPERATE UNIFIED CONTINGENCY COMMAND?

Military organizations are formed, manned and organized to accomplish military missions. The mission of a combat command is to engage in combat and defeat a threat. EUCOM, PACOM, LANTCOM, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM are geographical commands whose missions are threat oriented in their particular portion of the globe. Some of these missions are readily definable because the threat is relatively definable, i.e. deter a Soviet military attack (although deterrence is an effect and not a mission, our geographical commands have had no problem in transitioning the effect into the mission and strategy required to achieve it).

Other missions, shared by all of them, are nebulous and difficult to plan for because the threat is nebulous. Examples of these missions are: support democratic forms of government and counter

threats to them; counter terrorism; counter drug trafficking; assist in humanitarian relief operations; provide for peacetime support, peacekeeping, and security assistance to allies; and be prepared to fight and terminate conflicts across the entire spectrum of conflict. Some of these missions in some areas are more quantifiable than others. Some of the threats are obvious, some are cloaked and some have not yet even manifested themselves.

Some of these missions require unique civil affairs, medical, engineer, special operations and conventional forces which are not assigned to the commands but are planned for out of assets which will be provided by: FORSCOM for army Active, National Guard or Reserve units based in the United States; Special Operations Command (SOCOM) for multi-service special operations forces such as Army Special Forces or Rangers, or Air Force or Navy unconventional warfare forces; and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) for air and sealift forces to deploy from CONUS to the theatre. These plans are coordinated and in many cases written by FORSCOM or SOCOM and TRANSCOM. Each plan must go through the services to fund, man, equip, logistically support and, through TRANSCOM, to ship.

The result is that each of the geographical commands has a series of plans requiring forces they currently do not command and may not even command when deployed in their area of operations. In addition each CONUS command has its own plan to support each geographical command and the only focal point is that they all must go through TRANSCOM for air or sealift.

The sizing, configuring, deploying, employing, command and sustainment of these forces brought into the theatre is complex.

Because in many cases the threat is nebulous and transient, the planning organization to be deployed is frequently nonspecific, as is the chain of command.²⁰ A force package deployed to SOUTHCOM to counter a conventional invasion of an ally would be different from the package deployed to assist the same ally to counter an externally supported insurgent force. Both deployed packages might consist of units and forces which: have never worked together before; upon deployment find themselves under a strange chain of command; have unfamiliar logistics support; and novel rules of engagement.

For example. FORSCOM might provide a light infantry brigade, a mechanized brigade, a divisional combat support and service support ad hoc package, a National Guard construction engineer battalion, a Reserve medical support hospital, and a Reserve civil affairs company - all under a forward deployed division headquarters which has never before commanded such an organization. From the Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC), the air component command of FORSCOM (and LANTCOM and CENTCOM), might be deployed several US Air Force tactical squadrons complete with their own service support. SOCOM might provide a Ranger battalion, an Air Force special operations force and a Navy unconventional warfare unit. TRANSCOM must coordinate the air and sealift deployment of the entire package into the country.

Who would command such an ad hoc created joint force? An ad hoc created Joint Task Force headquarters? Or can SOUTHCOM provide the headquarters from organic assets? In either case the headquarters will probably be a novel one - unfamiliar with the forces assigned, creating new chains of command and support, and possibly unfamiliar with the terrain, mission, threat and rules of engagement. This is

called an evolving force - we paste things together as we go and modify the solution to meet the needs of the moment.

From the above example, and many similar ones, it is obvious that there is a need to establish under one major headquarters a flexible array of forces that can be tailored to execute numerous diverse missions world wide. These forces should be assigned to the headquarters and not just dedicated for planning purposes. This headquarters would, under the supervision of the geographical commands, write and execute plans based on the knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the forces available. Because all the forces are assigned, they could plan, train and exercise as cross attached joint packages at all times. Thus, when called upon to execute a contingency mission, the executing headquarters has experience in employing and sustaining joint heavy and light force packages. In many cases small, well trained and integrated force packages, rapidly deployable and with planned sustainment, are far superior to larger ad hoc organizations difficult to command, deploy and support.¹⁹

Financially, it is of course impossible to create such a diverse force package and assign it to each overseas command. In addition, from an international psychological aspect, it is preferred to maintain contingency forces in CONUS. Even our strongest allies could perceive a forward deployed force as an in-country threat and the force certainly would be a target for terrorist action. CONUS based forces are more flexible, responsive and not an easy target. The threat of this type force projected and sustained from CONUS has a significant psychological deterrent capability.²⁰

While this CONUS based force has certain advantages (a stable chain of command, a planning and executing headquarters, a focal point for joint doctrine, training and exercises), it has a singular disadvantage - the requirement to rapidly transport the force and sustain it from CONUS. Adequate global air and sealift assets are essential to a credible power projection force.²¹

An argument could be made that there is a joint headquarters that can plan and integrate diverse forces for commitment worldwide - the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In the past 20 years the JCS planned three significant joint operations. One failed to accomplish its mission - the Son Tay Raid. Another was a catastrophic failure - the Iran Rescue mission. The third -Grenada- was a success, but the lessons learned, given the threat encountered, were rather shocking. In all three cases the JCS planners did not execute the mission and the headquarters that did execute the mission had virtually no say in the planning. Two other missions were not planned by the JCS but they were so micro-mismanaged that they too failed - the Mayaguez rescue and the Marine "presence." mission in Lebanon from 1983 to 1984 which resulted in the deaths of 241 Marines. A proven military axiom is that planners must be responsible for mission execution and mission executors must be responsible for making their plan.²² The JCS, even after Goldwater-Nichols, can not plan and execute operational or tactical missions, nor should it.

But the JCS does have a proven procedure for mission planning and execution. It is found in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces. This procedure is called the formation of a unified command when either one of the following criteria applies: first, when a

broad continuing mission exists that may require the execution by one or more services under single strategic direction; and second, when any of the following exist: a large scale operation by a large scale force is required; or a large geographic area requires a single responsible command for the execution of operations; or there is a necessity for the common utilization of a limited logistics means.²³ I maintain that all of these prerequisites exist for the formation of a contingency command.

ADVANTAGES OF A SEPERATE US CONTINGENCY COMMAND (CONCOM)

If CONCOM is assigned a flexible array of Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, Special Operations Forces and the lift forces needed to move them by air and sea, it will be able to:

1. BETTER PLAN FOR CONTINGENCY MISSIONS. CONCOM is a full time planning and training headquarters with no geographical in-country distractors. It has access to not only the overseas commands requirements and data base, but also to the considerable data bases found in the Departments of State and Defense, as well as in the Intelligence community. Better planning is also produced because CONCOM has assigned joint combat, support, service support forces and the assets to deploy and sustain them.²⁴ With permanently assigned forces, it can better study and understand the strengths and weaknesses of each component. There is no current CONUS command that is joint organized

for the purpose of planning and employing contingency forces.

2. BETTER TRAINING FOR CONTINGENCY MISSIONS. The diverse and full supporting joint assets assigned to CONCOM train, deploy and are sustained as force packages. It has the CONUS training base and training areas which are collectively better than any overseas geographical command. And, most important, it has the sole mission to train for and execute contingency missions. Overseas geographical commands have contingency missions in addition to other missions. And they do not oversee the training of the CONUS based forces which might execute the missions. In their geographical area, none of them have the flexible array of forces to draw from and task organize. There is currently no CONUS command which is responsible for joint training for contingency missions. FORSCOM has that task but it is not joint organized, commands and trains no joint forces and has no employment responsibility.

3. BETTER COMMAND AND CONTROL CONTINGENCY MISSIONS. CONCOM's assigned forces plan, train, exercise and are employed and sustained cross-attached. This results in forces who are deployed to execute missions under a chain of command and with sustainment packages they are familiar with.²⁵ Under the current organization, forces are mixed and matched from all the services and assigned to a newly created Joint Task Force headquarters with minimal and occasionally no prior joint training. Examples: Iran Rescue Mission, Panama reinforcement by a light battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion, Grenada, Mayaguez Rescue, the essentially Marine mission in Beirut which was supported by Army, Navy and Air Force assets. A subordinate division, corps or CONCOM headquarters itself would command deployed forces

while under the command of the theatre geographical CINC or under JCS. In any case, the CONCOM deployed package is a professional, joint organization, with previous training experience under its deployed headquarters..

4. EXECUTE SIMULTANEOUS CONTINGENCY MISSIONS. The CONUS base has enough forces to be able to execute several small contingencies simultaneously. No overseas geographical command has such uncommitted forces available.

5. BETTER SUPPORT CONTINGENCY MISSIONS FROM CONUS. The deployment and sustaining forces are part of CONCOM and habitually exercise as a single joint force package. Although current and foreseeable air and sea transportation assets are not optimum, they can be made adequate if properly organized and trained.

ORGANIZATION OF CONTINGENCY COMMAND

Once it is accepted that a separate contingency force command is required, then its organization becomes an infinite combination of forces. The hardest part is to accept that this command must have assigned, and not merely dedicated for planning, a mix of types of forces, from all services, to plan, train, deploy, fight and support missions across at least the low and mid intensity levels of the conflict spectrum.²⁶ The reader may soon come to realize that some of the forces and missions which are described below come out of the FORSCOM assets and mission list. But FORSCOM is both a DOD

specified and Department of the Army command. In addition, it is the Army Component Command for LANTCOM and provides the Army Component Command for CENTCOM. And it is also the training and mobilization headquarters for all Army National Guard and Reserves. It is a combination of 5 major headquarters with 12 general and wide ranging missions.²⁸ A single statement of fact will give the complexity of the FORSCOM task: FORSCOM commands or is responsible for overseeing 1.6 million active, reserve and national guard soldiers and civilians.²⁷

MISSION. The mission of CONCOM would be: to command, plan, train and, on order, deploy and employ military forces either independently or under the command of a geographical unified command to conduct low to mid intensity level combat operations..

FORCE COMPOSITION. The force composition would be: Headquarters, CONTINGENCY COMMAND; Army Component Command; Air Component Command; Naval Component Command; joint Transportation Command (from TRANSCOM); and a joint Special Operations Command (from SOCOM).

HEADQUARTERS, CONTINGENCY COMMAND. This 4 star command headquarters would consist of a staff of not more than 250 officers and men. The headquarters would have assigned to it a Headquarters Company, Communications Company and an Intelligence Company. All would be ~~joint~~. In addition, the headquarters would have five, ~~twenty-man detachments~~ which would be stationed with each of the overseas geographical commands. These detachments would be liaison with the commands and initially draft and coordinate the plans CONCOM would execute.

Army Component Command. This 3 star command headquarters would

consist of 200 Army officers and men. It would be an administration and logistics headquarters for all army troops assigned to the Contingency Command. Assigned to it would be two army corps which would be under the combatant command of CONCOM. These corps are the primary operating arms, the true "mailed fists", of CONCOM. Each corps headquarters would be joint so that it might assume command of a deployed task force under CONCOM or a geographical command. Each corps would be fully deployable and consist of: corps troops; an airborne brigade; an air assault brigade; a mechanized infantry division; and a light infantry division. Each division headquarters would be prepared for significant cross attachment from the other division as well as augmentation from one of the brigades, corps troops, or other elements of CONCOM. Both the corps and division headquarters as well as their troops and other assigned forces would be essentially the same as current tables of organization and equipment. There would be some "lightening" of the units due to their global rapidly deployable mission. They would not carry the baggage of the geographical corps we now have. It must be remembered that neither corps nor CONCOM is designed to fight Soviet Combined Arms Armies in the classical European scenario. They are designed for contingency missions against possibly, if not probably, Soviet equipped and trained forces.

Air Component Command. This 3 star, 200 man headquarters would provide administrative and logistics support to the air force assets assigned to CONCOM. It would consist of two air wings. Each wing would be dedicated to support one of the army corps and, when deployed, be OPCON to that Corps. Each wing would consist of a

support and maintenance squadron and three squadrons of F16s with 24 aircraft assigned to each.

Naval Component Command. This 3 star headquarters would have assigned to it, possibly on a rotating basis: two carrier battle groups; one battleship battle group; sufficient surface and subsurface escorts to safeguard sealift deployment from CONUS to the area of operation; and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Special Operations Command. This subcommand of CONCOM has access to all SOCOM assigned forces. It would plan and coordinate the use of special operations units to support CONCOM.

Transportation Command. This subcommand of CONCOM would have access to all TRANSCOM assigned forces but have assigned to it: two composite airlift wings of one C5B, one C141B, and one C130H squadron each (12 aircraft per squadron); four CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) 747s available on 12 hour callup, with four more available on 24 hour callup; and one Military Sealift Command (MSC) Squadron of: one Fast Support Ship (FSS) SL7, two Roll-On Roll-Off (RO/RO), two Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH), two SEABARGES, and one diesel and aviation gas tanker. These ships would be assigned and available on a daily basis for training or mission execution. An additional three SL7s, five RO/RO, four LASH, four Container Ships and four tankers are available on 5 day callup with a like number available on 10 day callup.

The logic of the force structure of the air and sea lift assets is as follows. A C141 squadron can airdrop two airborne battalions (possibly to secure an airfield). They might have been preceded by the C130s (each of the twelve capable of carrying 90 soldiers) which could have airdropped a full Ranger battalion to recon or carry out

special operations missions. A C5B squadron can airland, for example, two mechanized infantry (M2 Bradley) companies, two light 105mm howitzer batteries, a brigade headquarters and a light infantry battalion (to further secure and expand the airfield). Four CRAF 747s can land two light infantry battalions. Thus each wing in one sortie from each of the thirty-six MAC and four CRAF aircraft has carried the combat elements of five to six battalions plus a brigade headquarters into the area, with limited combat support and service support. A second sortie of the wing could bring in a second brigade headquarters, two more light battalions, the remaining combat support for each of the two light brigades, an advance division headquarters and three days' supplies. One sortie from all the MAC aircraft of one wing can carry a combination of 6,000 troops or 2000 tons of equipment or supplies, and each 747 can carry 480 soldiers.²⁸ It must be remembered we are using only one of the two wings available to the CONCOM.

After the Marine Expeditionary Brigade has secured a port (by force if necessary), the immediately available MSC Squadron can discharge the non-air delivered equipment for a composite division of two light infantry brigades, an airborne brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, the division combat support and service support equipment, ground support for the MAC wing and the TAC F16 wing and 10 days of supply for the division task force. The five day callup ships can carry into theatre the remaining equipment for one of the two corps task forces and supplies to carry them for 30 days.²⁹ The personnel for the corps are carried in by the MAC wing and CRAF.

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONTINGENCY COMMAND

There are many possible scenarios for the deployment of a brigade, a division, a corps or both corps of CONCOM. The force structure outlined above is flexible, potent and sustainable. Moreover, it is rapidly deployable. Further, all the assets above, save the CONCOM and the service headquarters, are available now. Some will need minor reorganization to promote a more efficient air and sea deployed force. They are not geographical corps, are light, but sustainable from CONUS.

The army component forces are indeed powerful and flexible. They can be employed as pure battalions, brigades or divisions, or task organized for maximum mutual support. Their logistics requirements range from a low 60 tons per day for a light brigade in a peacekeeping role to a high of 600 tons per day for a mechanized brigade in combat.³⁰

Elements of the Special Operations Forces, because they are made up of army, air force and navy units, can operate anywhere in the world. But they are not designed for prolonged conventional operations and, if employed in this manner, will require ground link-up as early as possible. They are superb for reconnaissance and stealth operations.

The Tactical Air Component's F16s are superb multirole aircraft. They are suitable for air superiority roles against all but the most advanced Soviet fighters, and best suited for air interdiction and

close air support. They do require sophisticated ground support and can not operate from austere airfields for any period of time.

The air wing of the Naval Component's carriers can augment or replace the F16s for air superiority or ground support. The E2Cs can extend aerial warning. The battleship can provide 16 inch gun support as far as 16 miles inland. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade or its battalions can secure a forced entry of ports or operate inland under the support of the carrier or land based Marine Air Squadron.

The Transportation Command ships will deploy and subsequently sustain the force. They will require a suitable port facility or will need to be augmented by crane ships or causeways. In the event of the latter, discharge times might be significant. The LASH and SEABARGE ships can carry lighters which can be floated to port or, only if necessary, to beaches. Beach gradients are of particular concern and a significant limiting factor. None of these ships are designed or intended to make assault landings. The port must be secure prior to their arrival. Port suitability and securability is the Achilles heel of CONCOM. Nor would the MAC aircraft be tasked to make combat assaults into airfields. The airfields will have to already be secured by airborne, marine landed or special operations forces. The 747s are not military aircraft, but each can carry 480 troops and 100 pounds of cargo for each man. In addition, they have a 7,000 mile radius of flight.

Contingency Command is indeed a powerful and flexible joint organization. Because all the components are assigned to the command, they will conduct frequent pure and cross attached training. Since

the transportation aircraft and sealift forces are also assigned, this is a where a significant portion of the training would be done.

Shortly after World War II General Eisenhower said, "Seperate ground, air and sea warfare is gone forever. If ever we should be involved in war again, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."31 I believe he was right. But despite rhetoric, each of the services fights for its own interests, regardless of who is best suited for the task. CONCOM would be a true joint planning and contingency executing organization.

SUMMARY

Since the end of World War II, the Department of Defense strategy has been geared toward the fighting of a high intensity conflict, most probably in Europe. This was due to the fact that high intensity conflict in Europe was possible and offered the greatest threat to the survival of the United States. Low intensity conflicts, though increasingly more probable, offered significantly less threat to national survival. But now, a major conflict in Europe is becoming increasingly less probable, while low intensity conflicts worldwide are becoming not only more probable, but continuously ongoing.

As social programs place an increasingly larger demand on the national budget, the money available for defense will be increasingly at risk. Even though the threat may not diminish, even though other threats may become increasingly obvious, funds to counter them will

be more and more difficult to acquire. What is needed from Defense is a potent, flexible and as relatively inexpensive a force as possible which can deal with diverse and currently vague or unexpected contingencies. Defense will never have the number and type of combat forces nor the air or sealift forces optimum for all possible needs. But the current combat force, or even a reduced size force, if slightly modified and reoriented, can be the flexible fire brigade we may have to accept. The current air and sealift planes and ships, while not optimum, can do the job, if organized, manned and resourced to do so.

Whether or not Mr. Gorbachev's announced intentions become reality and the Soviets decrease their capabilities, the United States still has worldwide commitments to its allies. These commitments require the rapid projection and sustainment of a potent combat force to engage in conflicts as diverse as peacekeeping or hostage rescue or assistance in repelling a second country's invasion of its allies. This projection and sustainment of combat power off our shores must be done with caution and the support of the American people, but if it is needed, it must be available, trained and deployable. Without a Contingency Command we will not have that force. With it, we will.

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